YCISS Research
Permanent URI for this collection
The Centre for International and Security Studies is a research unit of York University dedicated to the study of international peace and security issues.
Browse
Browsing YCISS Research by Subject "arms control verification"
Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
Results Per Page
Sort Options
Item Open Access A Survey of Game Theory Models on Peace and War(YCISS, 1990-03) O'Neill, BarryThis paper will present a survey of game theoretical applications to peace and war relevant to the continuing debate on the theory's place. (Some contributions are by Deutsch, 1954, 1968; Waltz, 1959; Quandt, 1961; Snyder, 1961; Shubik, 1968; Robinson, 1970; Rosenau, 1971; Junne, 1972; George and Smoke, 1974; Plon, 1976; Martin, 1978; Wagner, 1983; Maoz, 1985; Snidal, 1985a; Hardin, 1986; Larson, 1987; Jervis, 1988a; O'Neill, 1989b; and Rapoport, 1989.) The review will be non evaluative, and will focus on the areas chosen for applications rather than developments in the mathematics. It will be fairly comprehensive in the international relations (IR) section, and include the main subjects in the military operations part. In regard to IR, I examine the mutual influences of the mathematics and the conventional theory or policy questions. The military section notes the interaction of game applications with new military strategy and technology. A companion paper (O'Neill, 1990b) surveys introductory writings for each game theory subfield that might be relevant to IR.Item Open Access Why a Good Verification System Can Give Ambiguous Evidence(YCISS, 1991-04) O'Neill, BarryThe recent debate on ambiguity provides lessons for future arms control verification. American officials sought verification systems that returned unambiguous evidence about Soviet compliance, but a simple model of verification suggests that a verification scheme can be more ambiguous yet better. It may be more effective in deterring violations and avoiding false alarms. The reason is as follows: should the inspecting party come upon suspicious evidence, it will, on the one hand, have a reason to trust that evidence more, as it was returned by a more reliable verification system. On the other hand it will have a reason to be more sceptical that the other is violating since the other would probably not dare to cheat in the face of the improved verification technology. In some situations a reasonable inspector will regard the second factor as weightier than the first, and give lower credence to the evidence. Ambiguity in verification is a tricky notion and misunderstandings about it arise from two sources: from the vocabulary of verification, which suggests that one dichotomously "detects" or does "not detect" violation, when in fact evidence comes in gradations, and from the human tendency not to look at the situation from the other's viewpoint. The model uses game theory's logic to represent the strategic aspects of the situation, and has a mathematical feature different from past models, the notion of continuous degrees of evidence, to give a proper account of ambiguity. It also clarifies past technical studies of verification by locating them within the model's structure.