Randomness and Mr. Goodman's Paradox

Date

1967

Authors

Cameron, Evan Wm.

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Abstract

Viable inductions can only be drawn from unbiased samples. A predicate like Nelson Goodman's 'Grue', therefore, cannot be used within inductions, for the temporal nature of its definition ensures that any sampling of objects that we could encounter would be biased with respect to it. The supposed 'grue paradox' is therefore neither paradoxical nor relevant to how we make viable inductions.

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Keywords

Bias (Mathematical), Goodman, Nelson, Gulliver's Travels, Hullett, Jay, Induction, Logic, Philosophy, Popper, Karl, Quine, Willard van Orman, Randomness, Schwartz, Robert, Cameron, Evan

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