Randomness and Mr. Goodman's Paradox

dc.contributor.authorCameron, Evan Wm.
dc.date.accessioned2019-04-23T14:47:17Z
dc.date.available2019-04-23T14:47:17Z
dc.date.issued1967
dc.description.abstractViable inductions can only be drawn from unbiased samples. A predicate like Nelson Goodman's 'Grue', therefore, cannot be used within inductions, for the temporal nature of its definition ensures that any sampling of objects that we could encounter would be biased with respect to it. The supposed 'grue paradox' is therefore neither paradoxical nor relevant to how we make viable inductions.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10315/36162
dc.language.isoen
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 2.5 Canada*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ca/*
dc.subjectBias (Mathematical)
dc.subjectGoodman, Nelson
dc.subjectGulliver's Travels
dc.subjectHullett, Jay
dc.subjectInduction
dc.subjectLogic
dc.subjectPhilosophy
dc.subjectPopper, Karl
dc.subjectQuine, Willard van Orman
dc.subjectRandomness
dc.subjectSchwartz, Robert
dc.subjectCameron, Evanen_US
dc.titleRandomness and Mr. Goodman's Paradoxen_US
dc.typePresentationen_US

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